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The present paper uses a survey of 1062 Czechs and 524 Slovaks to ask why people
evade taxes. We maintain that the Czech and Slovak Republics are “twins” separated
at birth and that divergences between these countries since their separation in 1992
can explain divergences in their rates of tax evasion. High Slovak tax rates and lower
Czech tax rates seem to explain little of the difference in evasion between the two
countries. Rising Czech incomes seems the main reason that Czech Republic evades
more taxes. We also look at detailed demographic and psychological reasons for tax
evasion. We find that morality is a strong deterrent to evasion.
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1. Introduction
This paper asks why people in the Czech and Slovak Republics evade taxes. We find
that taxes may be of secondary importance in determining how many people evade.
The morality of evaders and their opportunities for evasion may in practice take
precedence in the decisions people make on how much to evade.
Why people evade is a growing field of empirical research, which is usually carried
out with the help of questionnaires administered by professional survey departments.
We followed the spirit of these past surveys and commissioned a survey of Czechs
and Slovaks in the year 2000. Ours is the first survey of this sort for both countries
and as such adds to the growing body of international evidence on tax evasion.
Our survey is unique in that it studies two countries that were nearly identical and
which then broke apart in 1992. The Czech and Slovak Republics are an example of
what Ashenfelter has called “twins.” Twins separated at birth are ideal for the study of
natural experiments. One twin can be viewed as the control, and the other as the
experimental subject. When the Czech Republic and Slovakia had officially split in
1993 they shared similar demographics, culture, and language, but set out on different
political and economic paths. Slovakia chose a policy of high taxes and stern
enforcement, while the Czech Republic decided to keep taxes low and enforced their
payment laxly. This divergence in tax policies between two nearly identical countries
allows us to examine without complicated methods of control how tax policy
influences tax evasion.2
Control and experimental groups can only answer questions about how different
policy treatment of the groups leads outcomes to differ. If we wish to understand
other reasons why people evade taxes we must search our survey for a link between
evasion and variations in demographics, and in beliefs about the morality of evasion
and the chance of apprehension. Using simple cross-tabulations as well as more
complicated multivariate methods we find much in our survey to confirm stylized
facts about evasion which Andreoni et al. (1998) have catalogued.
We begin our paper by giving an overview of tax evasion in the Czech and Slovak
Republics. We want to closely compare what our data tell us, with stylized facts about
evasion that have emerged in the last 20 years of research. Our main benchmark
against which we will compare our data is research done on US TCMP audits. US
data are the best known and most studied. These data must figure in any comparison
with data from transition countries. With several exceptions we find that Czechs and
Slovaks evade in patterns similar to which Americans evade. Once we have
established the ways in which our sample compares to stylized facts about evasion we
see what light our sample sheds on the controversial questions in tax evasion.
1 One of
the most contested issues in the analysis of tax evasion is whether high taxes
encourage evasion. As Andreoni et al. (1998) write “Theoretical models generate no
clear predictions on the effects of tax rates on compliance. The presence of both
income and substitution effects complicates the analysis, and special assumptions
about the form of penalties, distribution income, and shape of preferences are often
required to identify any comparative static.” Complicated econometrics have
generally been required to isolate the effect of taxes on evasion. We believe that
Czech and Slovak data may, with less arduous treatment yield information on the link3
between taxes and evasion because of the possibility that both countries were “twins”
when they separated. The latter part of our paper explains why we believe the Czech
and Slovak Republics are similar enough to warrant being called twins. We explain
that they resemble each other along dimensions which are relevant to tax evasion. We
then discuss how separation between the two countries and the ensuing difference in
tax policies influenced tax evasion. We find that the most important determinants of
tax evasion in the case of the Czech and Slovak Republics was not a divergence
between tax rates, but rather the difference in opportunity for tax evasion in each
country.
2. Data Challenges and Survey Methodology
As Giles (2000) explains, there are several ways to measure tax evasion: tax audit
surveys, money demand methods, latent variable techniques, tax overhang methods,
labour force surveys, and surveys asking individuals how much they evade. Surveys
are useful for understanding why individuals evade taxes at any point in time, whereas
macro-methods such as latent variable analysis and tax-overhang approaches are more
appropriate for time-series analysis of tax evasion.
At present the only estimates of the underground economy for the Czech and Slovak
Republics are those of the Ministry of Finance which is primarily concerned about
collecting unpaid-backtaxes from firms. Until our survey, there were no independent
academic estimates of the size of tax evasion in the Czech and Slovak Republics.
There is a similar dearth of such estimates for other transition countries, yet
understanding how tax evasion is evolving and why it evolves as it does is crucial for
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 An overview of related subject of corruption in the Czech Republic  is exposed in detail by Lizal, Kocenda (2001)4
governments wishing to provide public goods at a reasonable tax-plus-deadweight
cost.
We have chosen the survey method of analyzing tax evasion because this method is
rich in demographic information. We can use demographic information to see what
characteristics of respondents are associated with evasion. The survey method also
allows us to ask respondents what they believe is the probability of being caught
evading and what penalties they believe they face, whether they believe evasion to be
moral, and whether they believe their wealth needs to be safeguarded by tax evasion.
These subjective data allow us to probe the effects of incentives on the decision to
evade. Survey data suffer from the lies respondents tell. We shall see that even though
lying may pervade the data, solid relations emerged between the questions we asked
and whether people evaded.
 In Western countries, survey companies usually call respondents on the telephone.
Czechs and Slovaks distrust phone surveys. The firm MEDIA carried out face-to-face
surveys on a random stratified sample of 1062 Czechs and 524 Slovaks. We include
the questionnaire in the appendix B to the present paper.  The standard demographic
questions need no explanation.
The main problem we faced was in knowing how much tax people evade.  The
obvious problem when asking people about their participation in the underground
economy is that they will be reluctant to confess their participation. Our survey
tackles this problem in stages. First we ask respondents whether they know of anyone
who has participated in the underground economy. Respondents might not feel5
ashamed about answering this question honestly. Knowing people who participated in
the underground economy could be a weak signal that the respondent also
participates. Next we ask whether the respondent has ever bought goods or services in
the underground economy. Finally, and this is perhaps the question to which
respondents will give the least honest reply, we ask whether they have themselves
ever participated in the underground economy and what is the nature of this
participation.
Table 1 summarizes the first (“soft”) level of inquiry of our survey. Rows 1 and 2
show the answer to what people thought about the size of the underground economy.
If people are rational observers of their surroundings, their opinions about the size of
the underground economy might be a fair estimate of the actual underground
economy. Giving an opinion about the size of the underground economy is not likely
to threaten a respondent so that we can expect the answers to be honest. Slovaks had a
significantly larger estimate of the size of the underground economy than had Czechs.
This is a first, tentative sign that Slovaks evaded more taxes by the end of the 1990’s
than did Czechs. This judgment rests on the assumptions that people can form
consistent estimates of the size of the underground economy and that Czechs and
Slovaks are similar in the way they form their judgments. We will justify the latter
assumption later in the present paper.6
Table 1: ￿Soft￿ measures of participation in the underground economy
Survey question CR SL Significant
difference
Percentage of adults in country having unreported
income
(variable A7 in appendix)
38.3 42.7 **
Percentage of neighbors having unreported income
(variable A8 in appendix)
33.2 38.8 **
Ever bought undeclared goods/services
(variable B1 in appendix)
49.4 50.0
Source: Survey data, authors’ computation
Row 3 of Table 1 summarizes the answers to more intimate questions than those
summarized in rows 1 and 2. Here we ask whether the respondent has ever bought
goods in the underground economy. The level of threat to respondents is greater here
than in the questions in rows 1 and 2, but still fairly mild, as there is no effective legal
sanction for those who buy goods from producers who evade taxes unless the law
forbids sale of these goods. There is no significant difference between what Czechs
and Slovaks answered. Both groups claim with equal frequency to have bought from
the underground sector. There is no contradiction between the finding that Czechs and
Slovaks buy equally from the shadow sector and the earlier finding that Slovaks
believe the percent of people with income from the shadow economy is higher than
for the Czech Republic. Our questions to respondents up to this point in the discussion
have been sufficiently vague to allow for several interpretations. Czechs and Slovaks
may buy equally from the black market but Slovaks may spend more in their
purchases. To get a more precise idea of how much tax people evade than the answers
given to the questions in Table 1 we need to put the question of evasion to
respondents baldly and hope that some respondents accept to answer our questions.7
The most intimate questions in our survey ask the respondent with what frequency he
has worked and not declared his income and how much money he earned from
activities upon which he did not declare to the publicans. Table 2 shows that Czechs
declared working with greater frequency on the underground economy than did
Slovaks consistently throughout the 1990’s.  For all three categories and each period
the difference between the Czech and Slovak Republics was significant at least the
5% level.
Table 2: Percent of respondents answering ￿Have you ever been engaged in the
undeclared sector?￿ (Variable C01 in appendix)
Intensity of
participation CR 2000 SR 2000 CR 1999 SR 1999 CR 1995 SR 1995
Often 3.5 1.3 3.3 1.3 2.7 1.1
Occasionally 21.7 13.5 17.3 10.4 12.7 8.0
Never 74.8 85.2 79.4 88.3 85.4 90.9
Source: Survey data, authors’ computation
Table 3 breaks down undeclared income into different income categories. Once again
all differences are significant.
Table 3: Percent of respondents admitting to undeclared income within certain
ranges (Variable C12 in appendix)
Income range CR SR
<10,000 Crowns 34.8 44.4
10,000-15,000 Crowns 10.8 6.0
15,000-20,000 Crowns 11.1 7.0
20,000-25,000 Crowns 5.5 3.0
25,000-30,000 Crowns 7.3 4.4
30,000-35,000 Crowns 3.3 0.5
35,000-40,000 Crowns 4.6 4.1
>40,000 Crowns 5.6 3.6
Source: Survey data, authors’ computation8
Finally, we asked people the number of hours on average which they evaded per
week. For the Czech Republic the average among those who answered this question
was 3.2 hours and for the Slovak Republic this number was 5.7 hours. This result,
combined with Table 3 suggest that even though Slovaks work more hours on average
in the underground economy, Czechs engage in a greater degree of high level tax
evasion than do the Slovaks. The columns in Table 3 do not sum to one hundred
because some of those surveyed did not respond to our questions. How do we piece
these findings with the finding in Table 1 that Slovaks estimate the number of people
deriving shadow income to be higher than what Czechs estimate? We can interpret
these results as saying that more people may be engaged in the shadow economy in
Slovakia, but that in the Czech Republic the level of tax evasion is higher.
Once again we must take care not to view the estimates of tax evasion in the above
tables as being accurate. Respondents might tell us how much they evaded but there
are two problems we must recognize while interpreting these responses. The first
problem with the estimates in Table 3 is that people lie about their incomes. Horry,
Palda, and Walker (1992) found that in surveys of consumer finances for Canada,
respondents consistently underreported their incomes by 10%. They were able to
arrive at this conclusion by comparing GDP imputed from the Canadian survey of
consumer finances with GDP derived from the national accounts. If people lie about
their legitimate income, chances are they will also lie about their shadow income. The
second problem with the estimates in Table 3 is that some respondents chose to
answer how much they evaded and others chose not to answer. The self-selection of
responses is a warning that our sample of answers may not be representative of the9
population of answers. The direction in which might go this potential selection bias is
not clear. Those who answer may have less to hide than those who do not answer. In
this case answers would underestimate the size of tax evasion. If the biggest tax
evaders are also the least risk averse people then sample selection could bias upward
our estimates of the underground economy.  If those who answered how much they
evaded are a random mix of the above two types then our estimate of the size of tax
evasion will not be biased but may suffer from a large variance. These problems can
damage attempts to measure the size of tax evasion but do not fuzz the answers to
other questions. One question we seek to answer is whether the tax evasion of Czechs
and Slovaks diverged after their countries split in 1992. Provided the direction of bias
is the same in both countries then the bias will wash out when we measure differences
between both countries.
Perhaps the most complicated problem posed by our measures of tax evasion is that it
is difficult, if not impossible in a survey to ask people exactly how much they evaded.
We can pose questions about the range in which their evasion might fall, but this form
of question bunches all the highest evaders into one group. We have no idea of the
upper limit of evasion in this highest group. Questions about how often people evade
give us an idea of the number of people participating in the shadow economy, but
once again, their answers do not accurately weigh the degree of their involvement.
These potentially frustrating aspects of the survey data are standard in this area of
research and force us to dose our findings with a heavy degree of interpretation and
nuance.10
3. Comparison to Established Stylized Facts
3.1 Demographics
Now that we have explained how we measure evasion we can look at simple averages
of our data to see if evasion in the Czech and Slovak Republics is similar to what are
now well-established stylized facts on international, and especially US evasion. The
first question of interest is the influence of demographics on evasion. Tables 4(a) and
4(b) confirm several stylized facts known from analysis of US TCMP data. First,
evasion seems to be mainly the business of men in both Czech and Slovak Republics.
This is result is in line with Baldry’s (1987) experimental work. Households whose
head is married are strong evaders. In line with TCMP data is our finding that after
the age of retirement tax evasion drops radically.  The effect of education and age on
evasion is not established in the research literature. We find no clear relationship
between evasion and education, and age, at least at this very basic level of analysis.
We find that those who are unemployed or own their own businesses are categories of
workers with the highest proportion of evaders.  This finding is in strong agreement
with General Accounting Office (1990) analysis of 1985 TCMP data.11
Table 4A: Structure of informal sector in Czech Republic: relative % shares
.
                                                          
1 The response rate for income range is lower than 100%: 47 respondents, i.e. 4% in CR and
22 respondents i.e. 4% in SR did not put down the income range
<10000
<10000, 
25000 ) >=25000 
Total % of 
individuals
Total 267 93 73 54 524
% share of total sample 25% 9% 7% 5% 49%
% share of informal sector 100% 35% 27% 20%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Sex
Male 530 50% 67% 59% 71% 76% 52%
Female 532 50% 33% 41% 30% 24% 48%
Age 
18 to 24 years 183 17% 22% 31% 19% 19% 17%
25 to 39 years 338 32% 35% 27% 38% 41% 35%
40 to 59 years 440 41% 40% 40% 40% 39% 41%
Older than 60  101 10% 3% 2% 4% 2% 6%
Status
Married 635 60% 55% 46% 62% 59% 60%
Single  w. partner 61 6% 7% 9% 5% 9% 6%
Divorced/widow(er) 152 14% 13% 14% 15% 9% 15%
Single w/out partner 214 20% 25% 32% 18% 20% 19%
Level of education
Primary 256 24% 26% 27% 26% 24% 25%
Without GCE 396 37% 51% 45% 58% 56% 40%
With GCE 49 5% 18% 18% 14% 19% 27%
Higher 14 1% 5% 10% 4% 2% 7%
Labor market position
Full time job 633 60% 55% 56% 58% 59% 60%
Part time job 35 3% 4% 4% 5% 6% 4%
Entrepreneur (no empl.) 68 6% 12% 12% 5% 13% 9%
Entrepreneur (w. empl.) 23 2% 4% 3% 3% 6% 2%
Pensioner working 19 2% 2% 0% 3% 0% 2%
Pensioner not working 120 11% 4% 4% 5% 2% 8%
Unemployed 59 6% 10% 8% 16% 13% 7%
Student 65 6% 6% 10% 4% 4% 5%











Active engagement in informal activities12
Table 4B: Structure of informal sector in Slovak Republic: relative % shares
.
                                                          
1 The response rate for income range is lower than 100%: 47 respondents, i.e. 4% in CR and
22 respondents i.e. 4% in SR did not put down the income range
<10000
<10000, 
25000 ) >=25000 
Total % of 
individuals
Total 83 37 13 10 276
% share of total sample 15% 7% 2% 2% 50%
% share of informal sector 100% 45% 16% 12%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Sex
Male 278 51% 80% 78% 95% 97% 55%
Female 270 49% 20% 22% 5% 3% 45%
Age 
18 to 24 years 104 19% 22% 27% 0% 40% 18%
25 to 39 years 192 35% 35% 19% 69% 50% 38%
40 to 59 years 199 36% 35% 41% 31% 10% 37%
Older than 60  53 10% 8% 11% 8% 0% 8%
Status
Married 312 57% 46% 43% 69% 60% 58%
Single  w. partner 18 3% 11% 8% 8% 0% 6%
Divorced/widow(er) 64 12% 13% 14% 15% 0% 10%
Single w/out partner 153 28% 31% 35% 8% 50% 26%
Level of education
Primary 191 35% 35% 38% 54% 0% 36%
Without GCE 160 29% 37% 30% 38% 80% 33%
With GCE 146 27% 28% 30% 8% 30% 24%
Higher 51 9% 1% 0% 0% 0% 7%
Labor market position
Full time job 285 52% 46% 41% 46% 40% 55%
Part time job 9 2% 4% 0% 0% 0% 3%
Entrepreneur (no empl.) 22 4% 10% 11% 0% 30% 3%
Entrepreneur (w. empl.) 2 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Pensioner working 5 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Pensioner not working 76 14% 10% 11% 15% 0% 11%
Unemployed 86 16% 28% 27% 46% 30% 17%
Student 40 7% 5% 8% 0% 0% 7%








Total % of 
individuals 
Total Sample
Active engagement in informal activities13
3.2 Perceived Penalties and Audit Probabilities
Scholz and Pinney (1993) surveyed individuals and found little relation to what
people believed to be the probability of audit with the true probability of audit. In
their research people tend to grossly overestimate the probability of audit. Czechs
cited an average probability of being caught evading taxes of 43.6% while Slovaks
cited a probability of 43.9%. Whether this is an accurate estimate or not is hard to
gauge. Though we were not able to establish an accurate figure, discussion with
Ministry of Revenue officials revealed that a minuscule fraction of tax returns in the
Czech and Slovak Republics are audited.  The case is similar to that of the US where
according to Andreoni et al. (1998) in the mid 1990’s 1.7% of returns were audited.
But of those audited, a large fraction may be subject to penalty. Perhaps our
respondents were thinking of the probability of being caught if one is audited. Our
survey questions were not precise enough to refine our interpretation. Our data at not
completely dumb on this point. Table 5 shows that those who evaded often had far
more precise estimates of the probabilities of apprehension than those who evaded
occasionally or not at all. This fits nicely with the view that those who are active in a
market will have a better sense of the size of that market than those who prefer to get
their news of the world from the morning papers. We also found that those who did
not respond to the question of precisely how much undeclared income they earned
had estimates of the penalties and probabilities of apprehension similar to whose
responded that they evaded often or sometimes.14
Table 5: Individual￿s assessment of how large is the underground economy cross-










Reaction of family and friends if
they discover you have undeclared
income (1=strongly agree,
5=strongly disagree)









What is the penalty for not
declaring 100,000 crowns
(variable A11 in appendix)
30,200 32,800 30,800 30,000
What is the probability of getting
caught
(variable A12 in appendix)
44.1 20.0 31.0 48.3
Correlation between above two cells
(A11, A12)
0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05
How many hours a day are you
engaged in undeclared work









Note: Standard deviations in brackets.
There are no studies of which we are aware that assess the accuracy of penalty
assessments by taxpayers.  In our survey we asked each respondent what he believed
was the fine for delaying payment on 100,000 crowns of taxes owed to the state. The
actual penalty is 20,000 crowns if the taxpayer himself bring to his evasion to the
attention of the authorities, and 100,000 if the authorities discover his evasion. The
average value cited by Czechs was 29,500 crowns while that cited by Slovaks was
28,600 crowns. Given that our survey question was not precise enough to distinguish
between the two types of penalty, the answers given by Czechs and Slovaks seem
remarkably well-informed. There was no statistical difference between the answer
cited by either groups. We were not able to establish the average penalty but tax15
evasion officials confirmed with us that the estimates survey respondents gave us
were not far off the mark.
In the research literature the question of how precisely people estimate the penalty for
evasion has taken a back seat to the question of whether the estimates of this penalty
vary with the frequency of evasion.  Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing (1987) studied
evasion in the Netherlands and found in the responses to their surveys that the
perceived severity of penalty was unrelated to the whether someone evaded taxes.
Elffers et al. (1987) also failed to find a correlation between the perceived severity of
the penalty for evading and the perceived likelihood of apprehension. Our data show
a result that differs from that of Elfers et al. (1987). Frequent evaders estimated an
average penalty of 32,800 crowns whereas infrequent evaders cited 30,800 and non-
evaders cited 30,000. There was also a positive and significant correlation (0.04)
between the perceived likelihood of apprehension for tax evasion and the severity of
the penalty for tax evasion. That experienced evaders tend to perceive a higher
penalty goes against the notion of “penalty illusion” whereby those who
underestimate the penalty tend to evade more than those who have a proper estimate
of the penalty. The above figures may be telling us that experienced evaders know the
two-tier structure of penalties for evasion and take an average of these two tiers
weighted by some probability of apprehension to come up with their estimates. They
may also be reporting the expected penalty for those who evade frequently, which is
likelier to be 100,000 crowns than 20,000 crowns.16
This is not random speculation on our part. As the previous paragraph indicated,
frequent evaders seem to have a shrewder assessment of the probability of
apprehension than do infrequent and non-evaders. This is the context in which
judgments of the accuracy of penalties by class of evader must be assessed. If
frequency of evasion improves the assessment of the likelihood of being caught then
education might also have an effect, even if we do not hold all other forces constant.
Our data did not confirm this speculation. Education was uncorrelated with the
assessment of the likelihood of being caught for evading, and, as one could expect
given the negative education result, income also bore no relation with the assessment
of the likelihood of being caught.
3.3 Morals
The influence of morals on tax evasion is a recent but spreading field of study. The
literature to date has focused on three possible social factors that influence evasion:
feelings of guilt and shame, belief that tax burdens are unfairly distributed, feelings
that the quality of government services is poor. Our survey allows us to address the
first two factors and a third factor not studied to date (bandwagon effects).
Erard and Feinstein (1994) found that incorporating “moral sentiments” such as guilt
and shame indirectly into an econometric model of tax evasion improved the model’s
fit. Their analysis did not use explicit information about whether people feel guilty or
ashamed and relied on restrictive assumptions about the form of the utility function.
We asked several questions that might proxy for shame and guilt. A question that
proxies for shame is what a person believes will be the reaction of friends and family17
should they discover he is evading taxes. Table 6 suggests that where the disapproval
of friends and family is high, evasion tends to be low.
Table 6: Percent of respondents cross-tabulated by frequency of underground
work and their assessment of its family reaction
This was borne out in statistically significant correlation between family reaction and
frequency of underground work for the Czech Republic and for the Slovak Republic.
A second proxy for shame is whether other people are also evading heavily. We asked
each individual what percentage of adults in his country was evading taxes and what
percentage of adults in his neighborhood were evading taxes. As Table 7 shows, both
bandwagon variables show a strong positive correlation with an individual’s evasion.
Individuals who evaded frequently by far had the largest assessment of the
underground economy. The most powerful correlation is between whether an
individual evades and what percentage of people in his neighborhood he believes to
be evading  (0.23 correlation between intensity of evasion and what percentage of
individuals in the country the respondent believes to be evading---variable A07 in the
appendix---and 0.31 correlation between intensity of evasion and what percentage of
CR SR Average CR SR Average CR SR Average
1 38,89 83,33 45,24 16,44 15,07 16,1 4,46 9,86 6,51
2 41,67 0 35,71 38,81 46,58 40,75 18,71 22,77 20,25
3 16,67 16,67 16,67 34,7 30,14 33,56 36,98 34,98 36,22
4 0 0 0 8,22 6,85 7,88 23,88 22,07 23,19
5 2,78 0 2,38 1,83 1,37 1,71 15,97 10,33 13,83
Family reaction 
(1=surely agree, 
3=do not know, 
4=probably do not agree, 
5=surely do not agree)
Often Occasionally Never
Frequency of underground work18
individuals in his neighborhood the respondent believes to be evading---variable A08
in the appendix).  That the assessment of the underground economy falls as an
individual evades less may be due to moral factors. An individual who believes few
around him are evading may feel coerced by custom to evade little. Of course the
causality may run in the other direction. Those who evade frequently may justify their
evasion by saying that it is alright because “everyone else is doing it.” Our data
cannot resolve this point, but merely show a relation worthy of further study. We also
found that the most frequent evaders are those who believe that there is little
difference between how much people in their neighborhood evade and how much
countrywide evasion there is. Frequent evaders may have wider contacts with the
underground economy than have infrequent or non-evaders and so assess that the field
of evasion is equally well trampled on both sides of the fence. Those who have little
experience of evasion may form tribal loyalties and believe that their neighborhood is
less sinful than those that surround them.
Table 7: Individual￿s assessment of how large is the underground economy cross-










According to you, what percent of
adults in the country have
underground income









correlation with intensity of evasion -0.18
According to you, what percent of
adults in your neighborhood have
underground income









correlation with intensity of evasion -0.27










Note: standard deviation in brackets19
A more direct approach to morals is not to seek out measures of guilt or shame but
simply  to ask people whether they believe evasion is moral and then to see if there is
any link between this sentiment and the individual’s evasion. Table 8 shows the
correlation between the answer to whether the respondent works in the shadow
economy often (value of 1), occasionally (value of 2), or never (value of 3), and the
morality variable in which respondents rank between 1 to 5 whether having
undeclared income is strongly immoral (5) or strongly moral (1).
Table 8: Cross-tabulation of morality with frequency of evasion for Czech and
Slovak Republics 2000
Source: Survey data, authors’ computation
Table 6 shows a positive tendency between evading taxes and the belief that such
evasion is moral. We also calculated the correlation between the rows and columns of
Table 6 and found it to be statistically significant. The strong correlation that emerges
between morality and evasion may be due in part to the simultaneity of these
quantities. A person who evades may justify his evasion by saying it is moral while a
person who believes it is moral to evade may feel himself free to evade. This is how
CR SR Average CR SR Average CR SR Average
1 17,65 16,67 17,5 2,7 0 2,03 0,41 2,32 1,13
2 26,47 50 30 18,92 27,4 21,02 7,19 12,53 9,19
3 50 33,33 47,5 59,01 61,64 59,66 43,57 50,35 46,1
4 2,94 0 2,5 18,47 10,96 16,61 40,11 28,07 35,62




Frequency of underground work
Often Occasionally Never20
morality and evasion may amplify each other. This does not invalidate the above
result but underlines that the above correlations may not be uncovering purely
structural relations.
Slovakia’s average reported morality was higher than that of the Czech Republic, yet
Slovaks estimated more of their countrymen participating in the shadow economy
than did Czechs. For Czechs the correlation between the two rows of Table 8 was
three times as high as that of Slovakia. Czechs who believed evading taxes was moral
felt themselves far freer to evade those taxes than did Slovaks. What can we make of
these seemingly contradictory findings? Without having performed a multivariate
analysis conclusions are premature. Our strategy of presenting evidence in tabular
form is meant to give a first impression. We will introduce regressions later and
discuss their meaning. For the moment our conclusion is that morality is a force with
contradictory and perhaps non-existent effects on tax evasion.
4. The Effect of Taxes on Evasion
As mentioned earlier, the effect of taxes on evasion is theoretically ambiguous and
subject to contradictory empirical findings. In this section we tackle the question in a
novel manner. We show how the separation in 1992 between Czech and Slovak
nations can be used as a natural experiment that reduces the number of control
variables needed to answer this question.
4.1 Background
After separating in 1992 the Czech and Slovak Republics took their finances along
different paths. In the Czech Republic President Vaclav Klaus followed a policy of21
vigorous privatization, deregulation, and low taxation. His opposite number in
Slovakia was slow to privatize and followed a policy of vigorous taxation. Table 9
shows that throughout the 1990s the Czech government progressively lowered its tax
burden while the Slovak government kept its taxes at relatively high levels right until
the new millennium. Czechs lowered this burden by reducing the top marginal tax rate
on income from 47% in 1992 to 40%  in 1997 whereas it took the Slovaks until 2000
to lower this rate from 47% to 42%. Slovaks made up for the shortfall in revenue by
increasing marginal tax rates in the middle ranges of income. Czechs have can
constantly lower rates on these middle income levels than have the Slovaks. The same
is true of the value added tax which in its lower tier was 5% in the Czech Republic in
2000 and 10% in the Slovak Republic and 22% in its upper tier in the Czech Republic
and 23% in its upper tier in the Slovak Republic. Throughout the 1990’s the Czech’s
lowered their VAT whereas Slovaks increased theirs.  A more detailed view of the
Czech and Slovak tax systems can be found in the appendix though we must warn that
the tables found there do not reflect the intensity with which tax authorities of the two
countries enforce collection. To date no single summary statistic of a tax system
exists, so that our statement that the Slovaks have a more intrusive tax system than the
Czechs must be recognized to have a subjective, or at least a less than perfectly
defined objective component.
Table 9: Ratio Total Taxes/GDP
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech Republic 41.20 40.50 40.00 36.20 36.40 36.00 37.10 36.80
Slovakia 36.40 38.80 42.00 41.00 38.40 37.10 35.30 34.20
Source: Czech Statistical Office and Slovak Statistical Office22
Differences in tax policies might lead to differences in tax compliance, though as we
have emphasized earlier, the theoretical literature is ambiguous on this point. The
relatively larger incursion of the Slovak government into the Slovak economy may be
cause for Slovaks to evade taxes more vigorously than Czechs. The brief survey of tax
evasion in Czech and Slovak Republics in section 2 suggested that Czechs evade
more intensively than Slovaks even though their tax rates are lower. If we can believe
that Czech and Slovak nations are identical in all but their tax policies then our
findings that lower tax Czechs evade more than higher tax Slovaks may count as a
further observation worthy of a notch in the international literature on the effect of
taxes on evasion.
Before leaping to such a conclusion we must be aware that simple comparisons of tax
evasion may not be appropriate for drawing conclusions about behavior if the subjects
tested differ along some dimensions relevant to tax evasion. Differences in tax
evasion between Slovaks and Czechs may be due not simply to different tax levels but
may also be due to variables for which we have not controlled. How can we test
whether identical twins, subject to different tax levels differed in the amount of tax
they paid? If we can believe that the Czech Republic and Slovakia are “twins” then
there is no need for complicated models which control for differences between the
two countries. “All” we need to do is measure the degree to which Czechs and
Slovaks evaded taxes ten years after separating and cross our fingers in the hope that
our twins are truly identical. In the next section we justify why we believe that
complicated controls are not necessary in our analysis of the differences in tax
evasion between the two countries.23
4.2 Justifying the Assumption that Czechs and Slovaks are Twins
As explained earlier, the present paper explores how tax evasion changes under the
pressure of changes in taxes. Our means of exploring these changes is to compare tax
evasion in two countries that are similar but that fell under different government
policies. If we can believe that both countries are the same then we need not worry
that differences in demographics, wealth, and culture can explain any difference we
might observe in tax evasion and morality. To make our exercise credible we must
give some evidence than in 1992, when the Czech Republic split from Slovakia, both
countries were “twins.” Czechs and Slovaks speak a similar tongue. At the start of the
20
th century this common cultural heritage of language was the main uniting feature
of these two peoples. On other dimensions Slovaks and Czechs differed significantly.
In 1920 Slovaks had a literacy rate of 72.3% whereas Czechs had a literacy rate of
96.7%. By the 1960’s these literacy rates had converged to close to 100%. Literacy
was not the only meter on which Czechs and Slovaks converged. As Table 10 shows,
newborn mortality converged over the century, as did the number of people per
doctor, the number of high schools per thousand people, and the average wage in both
countries. The main message of Table 9 is that as the century wore on Slovakia and
the Czech lands converged on the above-mentioned indicators. The final great push
toward convergence came during the communist era. Part of communist strategy for
holding power was to flatten differences between groups of people, perhaps so that no
concentrated interests could form to oppose their regime. By 1991 Czechs and
Slovaks were so at ease with each other that they had a very high level of
intermarriage. Of married Czech men 7.4% took Slovak wives.24
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Source: Czechoslovak statistical yearbooks 1921-199025
Table 11 gives some summary statistics from our survey on demographic and








Divorce rate 10.5 7.3 **
% working full-time 59.5 51.1
% Gypsies 0.2 0.6
% ethnic 6.4 10.3 *
Average age 39.9 38.6 *
% population with high
school or greater
9.2 9.2
% living in towns of more
than 20,000 inhabitants
45.7 40.9 *
% women 49.9 50.7
Average size of household 3.0 3.7 **
Source: Survey, authors’ computation
Table 11 shows that there are some differences in our survey between Slovaks and
Czechs. There is a slightly higher percentage of ethnic populations in Slovakia than in
the Czech Republic. Slovaks tend to be more “rural,” though this must be qualified by
noting that a detailed cross-tabulation shows that the difference arises largely from the
fact that there are fewer towns of more than 100,000 in Slovakia. Detailed cross-
tabulation showed that the percentage living in villages of fewer than 1000
inhabitants---the true rural setting---are identical in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
Slovaks have lower divorce rates in our survey and larger families than do Czechs.
Whether these differences disqualify our sample as representing twins is not clear, but
the possibility must be kept in mind. Variables that seem likely to be associated with
tax evasion such as education, job satisfaction, and percentage of Gypsies, are the26
same in our sample for both countries. The main difference arises from the structure
of incomes. A detailed cross-tabulation showed lower average income for Slovaks.
The above tables show that the Czech Republic and Slovakia were twins only on
some very broad demographic and economic aggregates. Since our study focuses on
all factors, which might influence tax evasion, we must also consider moral factors.
There are objective and subjective variables that can cast light on morality in both
countries at the start of the 1990’s. One objective variable to consider is adherence to
religion. Table 12 shows that even as far back as the 1930’s there did not seem to be
strong differences between the countries except in the percent of people who claimed
to have no beliefs. Far more Czechs claimed to be without belief than Slovaks. On
this score at least there is some call to be concerned that the twins differ in their moral
outlooks. This conclusion softens when we consider the answers given by Czechs and
Slovaks to subjective questions about their views on society. Examination of a social
survey from 1992 shows that for most questions Czechs and Slovaks have similar
views.
Table 12 Structure by religion in 1947
Religion Czechia (Moravia) Slovakia
Catholic 74.78% (78.40%) 71.61%
Orthodox Catholic 0.11% (1.90%) 6.42%
Missing or without belief 5.2% (10.04%) 0.61%
Source: Czechoslovak statistical yearbooks, 1950
The list of variables we have presented in Tables 10-12 is not exhaustive. An
important critique of our list is that it fails to measure some intangible barrier such as
“national spirit” which may come between the twins in our story and make them as27
different from each other as is France from England. Why did Slovakia and the Czech
Republic split if not for some deep-rooted difference between the two countries? Was
not the similarity between the two an artificial condition embalmed by a dictatorial
communist regime? To answer such a question in detail would take us deep into the
annals of historical scholarship, but some answer must be given to the critique that
both countries split because they were fundamentally different. In 1992 the Czech
Republic and Slovakia separated suddenly. Slovak politicians asked Czech politicians
for the right to separate and Czech politicians granted their wish with little hesitation.
No referendum was held to decide the future of both parts of Czechoslovakia and
many Czechs and Slovaks were genuinely surprised that their country was breaking in
two. According to the Institute for Public Opinion Research, the majority of citizens
would not have voted for the breakup of Czechoslovakia. Those citizens who did not
agree with separation tended to see separation as the work of distant politicians
belonging to the Civic Democratic Party on the Czech side and the Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia on the Slovak side. Forty five percent of Czechs and forty four
percent of Slovaks believed that a referendum was the only acceptable way of
dissolving their country.
The experience of Quebec’s two referendum campaigns on separation, in 1980 and
1995 suggest that as campaigns unfold and information about the consequences of
separation are revealed, popular support for separation plummets. Referendum
campaigns on separation seem more like times to discuss the grievances of all parts of
the country and to come to some form of understanding and accommodation. Much of
the surprise and dismay with separation was seen on the face of Czech businessmen
who had sold goods on credit to Slovak businesses. After the split Slovak businesses28
defaulted heavily on their obligations to their creditors. This anecdote is one of many
which suggests that Slovaks and Czechs were not seriously thinking about separation,
and that the split was engineered or perhaps stumbled over by a few politicians.
By the end of the millennium Czechs and Slovaks still resembled each other on
demographic and social dimensions but differed in their average incomes and
unemployment rates. By 2000 Slovakia’s average income had fallen below that of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia’s unemployment rate was higher. These differences in
economic variables pose a problem for our analysis. We wish to ask how changes in
taxes change tax evasion in the Czech and Slovak twins. If the incomes of both
countries differ significantly, how can we know that changes in tax evasion and tax
morality are due truly to changes in taxes and are not due to changes in income?
Czech incomes are higher on average than Slovak incomes and it is well established
in the evasion literature that evasion rises with incomes. We can meet the critique
head-on by controlling for income through some statistical technique such as
regression. This, of course is what we had wished to avoid. Perfect twins need no
statistical controls to establish the effect of an outside force which drives a wedge
between the behavior of the twins. All is not lost. Having to control on just a few
dimensions is always preferable to controlling on many dimensions because one can
never be quite confident of the quality of controls one is using. The next and final
section plunges us into a multivariate analysis which the similarity of the Czech and
Slovak Republics allows us to make it as economical as anything that has appeared in
the previous literature on evasion.29
4.3 Untangling the effects on evasion of income and taxes
The results of this paper so far are that Czechs seem to evade more taxes than do
Slovaks but that more Slovaks work in the underground economy than do Czechs.
Why do these twin countries differ in their degree of tax evasion? More precisely,
why, if taxes are so much higher in the Slovak than in the Czech Republic, is the
Slovak Republic not a clear-cut leader on all dimensions of tax evasion? We have
already seen that Slovaks seem more bound by morality than Czechs, but we noted
the possibility of a strong simultaneity between self-reported morality and self-
reported evasion. This leaves income as the major divider between the Czech and
Slovak twins. Perhaps this difference in income accounts for the difference in tax
evasion more does the difference in taxes. As mentioned earlier, theory and empirical
research are in agreement that evasion rises with income.
Table 13 is a cross-tabulation of income and the frequency of underground work
where row percentages appear above each column percentage.
Table 13
Frequency of underground work Income third
Often Occasionally Never
3.3 20.1 76.6 Lowest
90.5 87.4 88.4
2.4 22.1 75.5 Middle
8.4 12.6 11.4
20.3 n.a. 79.7 Highest
1.2 n.a. 0.2
Source: Survey data, authors’ computation
Table 13 shows that among those who evaded often and occasionally, the intensity of
evasion drops off with income, and that, controlling for the number of people in each
income group (looking at row percentages), those with high incomes tend to evade30
most. This suggests that the tendency for Czechs to intensively evade taxes is high
because the Czech Republic has more high income people than does the Slovak
Republic.
So far we have been content to present our results in tabular form because of our
confidence in the “twinness” of the Czech and Slovak Republics. The value of the
twins analogy comes from taking the Czech and Slovak Republics as our units of
analysis. Our survey allows us to deepen our insights into the reasons for tax evasion
by turning our heads from the perspective of countries and focusing on the individual.
The natural experiment we explored for the Czech and Slovak Republics was one
which allowed us to see whether changes in taxes led to changes in tax evasion. The
only variable for which we had to control was income. Our natural experiment did not
allow us to delve into the many reasons for which individuals of both the Czech and
Slovak Republics evade. A multivariate analysis of both countries allows us to seek
such knowledge. While we would expect the results from our natural experiment at
the macro-level to carry over to the individual level, we must also be careful not to
fall into a “fallacy of composition,” also known as the “ecological fallacy” which
researchers make when they leap to conclusions about the whole from findings on the
individual, or vice versa. Table 14 shows probits taking intensity of work on the
underground economy (1=frequently, 2=sometimes, 3=never) as the dependent
variable. We have chosen this as the dependent variable because it is the question on
evasion to which we had the most responses. In fact, everyone answered this question.
The large response to this question provides us with many observations on which to
run our observation-hungry probit analysis, but leaves us with the uncomfortable
feeling that many of the answers we were given were false. A more satisfying31
situation would have been one in those individuals who are prone to lie about their
underground participation simply refuse to answer. In this circumstance we could
have performed a two-stage Hausman correction analysis for self-selection.
Table 14: Probit estimation of the effect of individual parameters on intensity of










0,4380 ** -0,010 -0,116 0,126
(0.1299)
0,0122 ** 0,000 -0,003 0,004
(0.0041)
0,4463 ** -0,012 -0,124 0,135
(0.1042)
-0,7781 ** 0,036 0,233 -0,269
(0.2633)
-0,5733 0,028 0,176 -0,203
(0.3238)
-0,7141 ** 0,026 0,207 -0,233
(0.2520)
-0,4055 0,014 0,120 -0,134
(0.2643)
-0,0876 0,002 0,025 -0,027
(0.3069)
-0,1758 0,005 0,051 -0,057
(0.1805)
0,0775 -0,002 -0,022 0,024
(0.1144)
-0,0100 ** 0,000 0,003 -0,003
(0.0026)
0,0000 0,000 0,000 0,000
(0.0000)
0,0066 ** 0,000 -0,002 0,002
(0.0019)
-0,1702 0,005 0,049 -0,054
(0.1304)
1,0305 ** -0,026 -0,265 0,291
(0.1310)
Estimate
According to you, what percent of adults 
in your neighborhood have underground 
income 
(variable A8 in appendix)
What is fine on 100,000 crowns of 
undeclared taxes? 
(variable A11 in appendix)
What is chance of being caught buying or 
selling undeclared goods or services? 
(variable A12 in appendix)
Secondary vocational without diploma
Grammar school with general diploma
Desired income 2500 crowns less than 
actual




Apprenticeship (3-4 years) without 
diploma
Have you ever bought goods on the 
underground economy?
(1=yes, 2=no)







The second column of the table shows the raw probit coefficient estimates. The third
to fifth columns are estimates of the marginal effects of the independent variables on
the dependent variable. The third column shows these marginal effects for the group
of frequent evaders. The fourth column shows marginal effects for occasional evaders
and the last column shows marginal effects for non-evaders. Variables of significance
are age (the older one is the more one tends to evade, except for the class of sometime
evaders), being female (for the class of frequent and sometime evaders, being female
has a negative effect on the chance of moving up a class), education (which has a
generally positive effect on intensity of evasion),  if one believes many others to be
evading  (the bandwagon variable A08 had a positive effect on evasion except for the
class of non-evaders), whether one bought goods in the underground economy (this
factor seems to push non-evaders into a higher level of evasion). Being Czech had a
negative marginal effect on evasion except for those who declared themselves to be
non-evaders. We did not include income because of its high positive correlation with
education and age. The coefficients attached to these latter variables suggest that
income, as in the tabular analysis, also bears a positive relationship to tax evasion.
5. Implications
So far the results of our analysis have been that tax evasion tends to bear no clear
relation to morality, or tax levels, but rather responds to income. There is nothing in
the Allingham-Sandmo model of tax evasion which would make this a surprising
result. In fact, Christian (1994) found that in 1988 in the US evasion, as measured by
underreported income, tended to rise with income, but less than proportionally.
Christian’s analysis though cannot be taken as general because he did not look at
income from corporations and businesses, nor did he consider those who did not fill33
out tax forms. Most attention has focused on whether higher taxes lead to higher
evasion. Clottfelter (1983), for example, found that noncompliance is strongly
positively related to the marginal tax rate. Our analysis suggests that tax levels, past a
certain threshold, may have little bearing on tax evasion. What is perhaps more
surprising about our model is the inconclusive role that morals play in the decision to
evade taxes.
The result that evasion seems to increase with income may fall out of an Allingham-
Sandmo (1972) model of evasion with an appropriately specified utility function. If
the taxpayer has decreasing absolute risk aversion, the rising incomes make it more
attractive to risk tax evasion. Utility functions are difficult to observe and referring to
them to explain behaviour gives the researcher perhaps too much freedom in drawing
conclusions. A more observable possibility is that income and tax evasion technology
are somehow linked. The “rich” may have better access to tax shelters and dodges.
This possibility may explain the broad consensus among economists, as expounded by
Sorensen (1994), and governments that income taxes are becoming a thing of the past
and that the more enforceable value added tax is the tax of the future. Scotchmer
(1989) explains how rich taxpayers can reduce the uncertainty of their tax liability by
hiring experts. An extension of his thinking is that the rich can also research methods
to evade taxes. As Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2000) explain, the Allingham-Sandmo
model of tax evasion has focused attention on risk aversion and hence on the utility
function. They write “This focus has to some extent obscured other important aspects
of the issue, such as the tax concealment technology.”34
One important aspect of evasion technology is the opportunity people have to declare
themselves self-employed. In both Czech and Slovak countries it is common for a
worker to go to a company office, work there, as would any other employee and still
declare himself to be self-employed. Such a declaration spares the company the need
to pay for the worker’s social security, and gives the worker the opportunity to deduct
from his taxes “business expenses” such as the cost of going to and from work. The
daring worker who declares himself self-employed may go so far as to deduct from
taxes the cost of his vacations as business trips, the cost of his car lease as business
cost, and maybe even his apartment rental. The danger to the worker is that tax
authorities investigate and find these expenses not related to his work. The benefit to
the worker is that such expenses allow him to evade taxes. In the US, Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2000) explain that 41.4% of self-employed workers voluntarily report their
true incomes. It would be nice to compare the number of self-employed in Czech and
Slovak Republics over time and relate this to the level of taxes. Such a comparison is
not possible because of the three available methods for reporting self-employment, the
Czech and Slovak Republics differ in the method they choose. These three methods of
measuring total number of self-employed are
1) By number of individuals being registered for self employment (in
the Czech Republic this is called a "Zivnostensky list").
2) By number of people calling themselves self employed (via labor market surveys).
3) By taking tax reports and looking number of the people actually filling taxes
declared as coming from self-employed revenue.
The Czechs currently report the first measure whereas Slovak information is on the
second measure. Even if these measures are not directly comparable, the number of
Czechs declaring themselves self-employed is so much larger than the number of35
Slovaks declaring themselves self-employed, that it is reasonable to suspect that self-
employment is greater in the Czech Republic than it is in the Slovak Republic.
Whether fewer Slovaks are self-employed because Slovak tax authorities enforce tax
laws more firmly than Czechs or because the lower income of Slovaks makes such a
complicated investment in evasion technology unprofitable is a question difficult to
answer with reference to our survey. As we mentioned earlier, Slovaks and Czechs
have the same beliefs about the probability of apprehension for evading taxes and
have the same beliefs about the penalties for tax evasion. This may mean that there is
no difference in enforcement technology, or it could mean that evaders adjust their
behaviour to attain a suitable risk-level and that this risk level is the same in both
countries. Inquiries into the role that available evasion technology offer taxpayers
should play a larger role in future enquiries on tax evasion in transition countries.
6. Conclusion
This paper has suggested that the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics was a
natural experiment, which allows us to analyze whether or not differences in taxes
lead to differences in tax evasion. Our tentative conclusion is that tax differences are
not as important as income differences for determining the degree of tax evasion.
Morality has an ambiguous effect on tax evasion and any conclusions about the
effects of morality on evasion are plagued by the problem of simultaneity.36
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Appendix A: Tax structures of Czech and Slovak Republics
Table A1:
Ratio Total Taxes/GDP
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech Republic 41.20 40.50 40.00 36.20 36.40 36.00 37.10 36.80
Slovakia 36.40 38.80 42.00 41.00 38.40 37.10 35.30 34.20
Ratio Direct Taxes/GDP
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech Republic 10.10 10.40 10.20 9.40 8.60 9.00 9.00 8.80
Slovakia 9.90 11.40 11.30 11.30 9.30 9.60 8.90 8.70
Ratio Indirect Taxes/GDP
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Czech Republic 12.00 13.10 12.60 12.50 11.80 11.20 12.20 12.30
Slovakia 12.70 13.20 14.00 12.20 11.70 10.90 10.80 10.90
Source: Czech and Slovak Statistical yearbooks, 1993-2000
Table A2
Corporate tax rates
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 45 42 41 41 39 35 35 32 31
S l o v a k i a 4 54 04 04 04 04 04 02 92 9
Tax bylaws, Czech and Slovak Ministry of Finance.38
Table A3: Personal income tax rates ￿ Czech and Slovak Republic
Personal income tax rates ￿ Czech Republic
 Marginal rate (in %) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
up 60 000 Kc 15 15 15 15 15
up 120 000 Kc 20 20 20 20 20
up 180 000 Kc 25 25 25 25 25
up 540 000 Kc 32 32 32 32 32
up 1 080 000 Kc 40 40 40 40 40
more than 1 080 000 47 47 47 47 43
  1997
up 84 000 Kc 15
up 144 000 Kc 20
up 204 000 Kc 25
up 564 000 Kc 32
more than 564 000 Kc 40
  1998 1999
up 91 440 Kc 15 15
up 183 000 Kc 20 20
up 274 000 Kc 25 25
up 822 600 Kc 32 32
more than 822 600 Kc 40 40
  2000 2001
up 102 000 Kc 15 15
up 204 000 Kc 20 20
up 312 000 Kc 25 25
up 1 104 000 Kc 32 32
more than 1 104 000 Kc 40 40
Tax bylaws, Czech Ministry of Finance.
Note that this table splits in certain years due to a change in the income levels at which one
passes to higher marginal rates.39
Personal income tax rates ￿ Slovak Republic
 Marginal rate (in %) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
up 60 000 Sk 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
up 120 000 Sk 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
up 180 000 Sk 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
up 540 000 Sk 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
up 1 080 000 Sk 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
more than 1 080 000 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
  2000 2001
up to 90 000 Sk 12 12
up to 150 000 Sk 20 20
up to 240 000 Sk 25 25
up to 396 000 Sk 30 30
up to 564 000 Sk 35 35
up to 1 128 000 Sk 40 40
more than 1 128 000 Sk 42 42
Tax bylaws, Slovak Ministry of Finance.
Note that this table splits in certain years due to a change in the income levels at which one
passes to higher marginal rates.
Table A4: Value Added Tax
Lower rate 1993 2001
Czech Republic 5 5
Slovakia 6 10
Higher rate 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 22 22
S l o v a k i a 2 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 3
Source:EBRD, Transition Report (1996-2000)40
In billions of Czech Crowns
(In % of GDP)





















































































































Source: Tax bylaws and State budget. Czech Ministry of Finance
In billions of Slovak Crowns
(In % of GDP)
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Tax Revenues 170.9 217.1 236.4 251.3 266.1 275.0 283.9
(38.70%) (42.00%) (41.10%) (38.40%) (37.10%) (35.30%) (34.20%)
Direct Taxes 50.1 58.5 64.9 61.0 68.5 69.3 72.4
(11.30%) (11.32%) (11.28%) (9.32%) (9.55%) (8.90%) (8.70%)
Corporate Income Tax 31.9 35.2 34.8 24.4 26.0 23.2 22.4
(7.20%) (6.81%) (6.05%) (3.73%) (3.62%) (2.98%) (2.60%)
Personal Income Tax 18.1 23.2 30.1 36.6 42.5 46.1 47.6
(4.10%) (4.49%) (5.23%) (5.59%) (5.93%) (5.92%) (5.89%)
Indirect Taxes 58.3 72.3 70.3 76.8 78.3 84.1 89.3
(13.20%) (13.99%) (12.22%) (11.74%) (10.92%) (10.80%) (10.90%)
VAT 37.1 52.3 48.7 54.9 55.3 58.9 61.4
(8.40%) (10.12%) (8.47%) (8.39%) (7.71%) (7.56%) (7.50%)
Social security
contributions 51.4 71.9 85.0 94.0 100.5 101.3 107.7
(11.60%) (13.91%) (14.78%) (14.36%) (14.01%) (13.00%) (13.12%)
Other taxes 2.6 4.2 4.8 4.2 4.5 4.4 4.5
(0.60%) (0.81%) (0.83%) (0.64%) (0.63%) (0.56%) (0.54%)
Source: Tax bylaws and State budget. Slovak Ministry of Finance41





QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY.
RAGE HOW OLD ARE YOU?
HNUM HOW MANY PERSONS (INCLUDING YOU) LIVE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLDS?
KIDNUM HOW MANY CHILDREN YOUNGER THAN 5 YEAR OLD LIVE IN YOUR
HOUSEHOLD?
TEENUM HOW MANY CHILDREN FROM 6 TO 18 YEARS OLD LIVE IN YOUR
HOUSEHOLD?
ADNUM HOW MANY ADULTS LIVE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD?
1 ADULT PERSON, LIVING ALONE 1
2 ADULT PERSONS WITHOUT CHILDREN 2
2 ADULT PERSONS LIVING WITHOUT CHILDREN 3
FAMILY ￿ PARENTS AND CHILDREN 4
FAMILY ￿ PARENTS, CHILDREN, GRAND PARENTS (1, OR
BOTH)
5
FAMILY ￿ PARENTS, CHILDREN, RELATIVES (1, OR MORE),
BUT WITHOUT GRANDPARENTS
6
INCOMPLETE FAMILY ￿ EITHER FATHER OR MOTHER
WITH CHILDREN  WITHOUT GRANDPARENTS
7
INCOMPLETE FAMILY ￿ FATHER/MOTHER  WITH
CHILDREN AND WITH GRANDPARENT(S)
8
INCOMPLETE FAMILY ￿ FATHER/MOTHER  WITH
CHILDREN AND WITH RELATIVES (WITHOUT
GRANDPARENTS)
9
GRAND PARENTS, CHILDREN WITHOUT PARENTS 10
A FAMILY WITHOUT A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP:
￿CHILDREN￿ PARENTS￿GRANDPARENTS￿
11











OTHER RELATIVE = UNCLE, AUNT, NEPHEW,
NIECE
8
RHPOS YOUR POSITION IN YOUR
HOUSEHOLD.
ONLY ONE ANSWER
WITHOUT FAMILY RELATIONSHIP 942
SINGLE, WITHOUT A PARTNER 1


















APPRENTICESHIP ( 2 YEARS) 2
APPRENTICESHIP ( 3-4 YEARS), WITHOUT GCE 3
SECONDARY VOCATIONAL WITH GCE 4
GRAMMAR SCHOOL WITH GCE 5
HIGHER 6
REDU YOUR HIGHEST ACHIEVED
EDUCATION LEVEL
WITHOUT SCHOOL EDUCATION 7
FULL TIME JOB 1  RISCO
PART TIME JOB 2  RISCO
OWNER OF A FIRM, DO NOT WORK IN THIS FIRM 3  RISCO
OWNER OF A FIRM, WITHOUT EMPLOYEES 4  RISCO
OWNER OF A FIRM, WITH EMPLOYEES 5  RISCO
PENSIONER, WORKING IN A FULL TIME JOB 6  RISCO
PENSIONER, WORKING IN A PART TIME JOB 7  RISCO
PENSIONER, NOT WORKING 8  HEAD
UNEMPLOYED 9  HEAD
MILITARY SERVICE 10  HEAD
CIVIL SERVICE 11  HEAD
STUDENT 12  HEAD
WIFE, WORKING IN A HOUSE ONLY 13  HEAD
REMPL YOUR JOB
POSITION
OTHER: 14  HEAD
RISCO WHAT IS YOUR JOB / PROVIDES
DETAILS, PLEASE
WRITE:43
JUST 1, ONE MAN BUSINESS 1
2 ￿ 5 EMPLOYEES 2
6 ￿ 25 EMPLOYEES 3
26 ￿ 100 EMPLOYEES 4
101 ￿ 1000 EMPLOYEES 5
RFEM HOW MANY EMPLOYEES WORK
IN THE FIRM, WHERE YOU
WORK
MORE THAN 1001 EMPLOYEES 6
YES 1  RINC HEAD ARE YOU HEAD OF YOUR FAMILY, I.E. IS YOUR FINANCIAL
CONTRIBUTION TO FAMILY BUDGET THE GREATEST? NO 2  HHEDU
PRIMARY 1
APPRENTICESHIP 2 YEARS 2
APPRENTICESHIP ( 3-4 YEARS), WITHOUT GCE 3
SECONDARY VOCATIONAL WITH GCE 4
GRAMMAR SCHOOL WITH GCE 5
HIGHER EDUCATION 6
HHEDU THE  HIGHEST ACHIEVED
LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF
HEAD OF YOUR FAMILY I.E.
OF A PERSON, WHO
CONTRIBUTES THE MOST TO
THE FAMILY BUDGET:
WITHOUT SCHOOL EDUCATION 7
FULL TIME JOB 1  HISCO
PART TIME JOB 2  HISCO
OWNER OF A FIRM, DO NOT WORK IN THIS FIRM 3  HISCO
OWNER OF A FIRM, WITHOUT EMPLOYEES 4  HISCO
OWNER OF A FIRM, WITH EMPLOYEES 5  HISCO
PENSIONER, WORKING IN A FULL TIME JOB 6  HISCO
PENSIONER, WORKING IN A PART TIME JOB 7  HISCO
PENSIONER, NOT WORKING 8  RINC
UNEMPLOYED 9  RINC
MILITARY SERVICE 10  RINC
CIVIL SERVICE 11  RINC
STUDENT 12  RINC






OTHER: 14  RINC
HISCO WHAT IS JOB OF THE HEAD/
PROVIDES DETAILS, PLEASE
WRITE:
JUST 1, ONE MAN BUSINESS 1
2 ￿ 5 EMPLOYEES 2
6 ￿ 25 EMPLOYEES 3
26 ￿ 100 EMPLOYEES 4
101 ￿ 1000 EMPLOYEES 5
HHFEM HOW MANY EMPLOYEES
WORK IN THE FIRM, WHERE
THE HEAD OF YOUR FAMILY
WORKS
MORE THAN 1001 EMPLOYEES 644
LESS THAN 10.000 KČ 1
10.001 ￿ 15.000 KČ 2
15.001 ￿ 20.000 KČ 3
20.001 ￿ 25.000 KČ 4
25.001 ￿ 30.000 KČ 5
30.001 ￿ 35.000 KČ 6
35.001 ￿ 40.000 KČ 7
MORE THAN 40.001 KČ 8
RINC CHOOSE A RANGE OF YOUR NET
MONTHLY INCOME; INCLUDING
SOCIAL BENEFITS
REJECTING A RESPONSE 9
LESS THAN 10.000 KČ 1
10.001 ￿ 15.000 KČ 2
15.001 ￿ 20.000 KČ 3
20.001 ￿ 25.000 KČ 4
25.001 ￿ 30.000 KČ 5
30.001 ￿ 35.000 KČ 6
35.001 ￿ 40.000 KČ 7
MORE THAN 40.001 KČ 8
HINC CHOOSE A RANGE OF YOUR
HOUSEHOLD NET MONTHLY INCOME;
INCLUDING SOCIAL BENEFITS
REJECTING A RESPONSE 9





A02 ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH
YOUR JOB?
STRONGLY NOT SATISFIED 4
MORE WORK FOR HIGHER SALARY 1
I AM COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH THE
CURRENT JOB
2
A03 IF YOU CAN CHOOSE,
WHAT WILL BE YOUR
CHOICE?
LESS WORK FOR LOWER SALARY 3
A04 WHAT IS A MINIMAL MONTHLY INCOME, WHICH SHOULD
COVER NEEDS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD IN YEAR 2000?
IS STRONGLY HIGHER 1
IS A BIT HIGHER 2
IS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME 3
IS A BIT LOWER 4




IS STRONGLY LOWER 5
IS STRONGLY HIGHER 1
IS A BIT HIGHER 2
IS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME 3
IS A BIT LOWER 4




IS STRONGLY LOWER 545
YOU SURELY KNOW THAT THERE IS ALSO AN INFORMAL / SHADOW ECONOMY IN THE
CZECH REPUBLIC.
ACCORDING TO YOU, WHAT PERCENT OF ADULTS IN THE CZECH
REPUBLIC HAVE ALSO AN INCOME FROM THE SHADOW ECONOMY?
A07
I DO NOT KNOW 98
ACCORDING TO YOU, HOW WHAT PERCENT OF ADULTS IN YOUR
NEIGHBORHOOD HAVE ALSO AN INCOME FROM THE SHADOW
ECONOMY?
A08
I DO NOT KNOW 98
STRONGLY MORAL 1
MORAL 2
NEITHER MORAL, NOR IMMORAL 3
IMMORAL 4
STRONGLY IMMORAL 5
A09 DO YOU THINK THAT
TO HAVE AN UNDECLARED
(UNTAXED) INCOME
IS:
I DO NOT KNOW 98
THEY SURELY AGREE 1
THEY PROBABLY AGREE 2
I DO NOT KNOW 3
THEY PROBABLY DO NOT AGREE 4
THEY SURELY DO NOT AGREE 5
A10 WHAT WILL BE THE
REACTION
OF YOUR FAMILY AND
FRIENDS




I DO NOT KNOW 98
A11 SUPPOSE YOU OWE  THE STATE TAX PAYMENT IN THE AMOUNT
100.000 KČ. WHAT PENALTY WILL YOU HAVE TO PAY AFTER A
YEAR?
A12 ON A SCALE OF 0 TO A 100, SUPPOSING THAT 0 IS BEING SURE YOU WILL
NOT BE CAUGHT AND 100 BEING SURE YOU WILL BE, WHAT WOULD BE
THE NUMBER CORRESPONDING TO THE RISK OF YOUR BEING CAUGHT
BUYING UNDECLARED GOODS AND SERVICES (OR JOBS)?
YES 1  B02 B01 HAVE YOU EVER BOUGHT GOODS AND SERVICES COMING
FROM UNDECLARED WORK? NO 2  B03
A. I NEVER NEED SUCH A GOOD OR SERVICES 12
B. I NEVER HAVE SUCH OCCASION 12
C. I THINK IT IS RISKY 12




E. OTHER REASONS: 12
A. CASH
B. CREDIT CARD OR BANK TRANSFER
C. EXCHANGE FOR OTHER SERVICES
B03 WHAT PROPORTION (IN %) OF
THESE UNDECLARED GOODS
AND SERVICES







B04 GENERALLY, HOW WOULD YOU COMPARE
UNDECLARED GOODS AND SERVICES WITH
DECLARED GOODS AND SERVICES (OR JOBS)
CONCERNING￿
1=UNDECLARED IS SUPERIOR, 2=EQUAL,
3=DECLARED IS SUPERIOR D. PRICE 123
A. FROM FAMILY MEMBERS 12
B. FROM FRIENDS 12
C. FROM PERSONS IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD 12
D. FROM COLLEAGUES FROM YOUR ACTUAL/
FORMER JOB
12
E. FROM YOUR ACTUAL/ FORMER EMPLOYEES 12
F. FROM YOUR ACTUAL/ FORMER BOSSES 12
B05 WHO DO YOU BUY
UNDECLARED
GOOD / SERVICES FROM?
1=YES
2=NO
G. FROM OTHERS 12
A. PRICES OF THESE GOODS/ SERVICES ARE
LOWER
12
B. LABOR COSTS ARE LOWER 12
C. BECAUSE THE GOOD OR SERVICE ARE
BETTER UNOFFICIALLY AVAILABLE
12
D. TO HELP SOMEONE WHO HAS PROBLEMS 12
E. TO HELP SOMEONE WHO IS UNEMPLOYED 12
F. BECAUSE THE GOOD OR SERVICE IS NOT
OFFICIALLY AVAILABLE
12
B06 INDICATE THE REASONS
THAT MADE YOU BUY
THESE UNDECLARED
GOODS AND SERVICES




G. OTHER REASONS: 12
B07 COULD YOU WRITE DOWN YOUR TOTAL EXPENSES FOR UNDECLARED GOODS
AND SERVICES (OR JOB) FOR 2000,
A. RENOVATIONS AND REPAIRS OF BUILDING (CARPENTRY, PLUMBING,
ELECTRICITY, PAINTING￿
B. HOUSEHOLD MAINTENANCE (CLEANING, SNOW REMOVAL, EXCAVATION
WORKS, LAWN MOWING￿)
C. RENOVATIONS AND REPAIRS OF GOOD (CAR REPAIR, BODY WORK,
BICYCLE AND ELECTRIC APPLIANCE REPAIRS￿)
D. ROOM RENTAL
E. BABY-SITTING, CARE SERVICES (NURSING, CARE FOR THE ELDERLY)
F. PERSONAL SERVICES (HAIRDRESSING TYPING, DRESSMAKING￿.)
G. PRIVATE CLASSES (DANCING, ENGLISH CONVERSATION￿)
H. SELLING GOODS (DOOR-TO-DOOR, TELEMARKETING￿)
I. TRANSPORTATION SERVICES (CHAUFFEUR, DELIVERYMAN, MOVER￿)
J. SERVICES RELATED TO WEDDINGS AND RECEPTIONISTS (MUSICIAN, D.J.,
PHOTOGRAPHER, SINGER, CATERER, ￿)
K. FOOD AND CATERING SERVICES
L. PURCHASE OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCOS
M. SALE OF FARMING, HUNTING, FISHING, AND FOREST PRODUCTS
N. FACTORY WORK (ENGRAVING, WOOD SAWING, WELDING￿)
O. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES (PSYCHOLOGY, MEDICINE, MATHEMATICAL,
ACCOUNTING, ARCHITECTURE ￿)
P. OTHER:47
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ENGAGED IN THE UNDECLARED SECTOR.





A. I NEVER NEEDED IT 12
B. I NEVER HAVE HAD AN OCCASION 12
C. I THINK IT IS RISKY 12
D. I THINK IT IS IMMORAL 12
C02 WHY HAVE YOU NEVER BEEN
ENGAGED IN THE UNDECLARED
SECTOR?
1=YES
2=NO E. OTHER REASONS: 12
WORK (BEING EMPLOYED) 1 C03 YOUR MAIN UNDECLARED
ACTIVITY YOUR OWN BUSINESS 2
C04 HOW MANY PERSONS WERE ENGAGED IN UNDECLARED ACTIVITY WITH
YOU IN 2000?
C05 HOW MANY HOURS A DAY WERE YOU ENGAGED IN UNDECLARED
ACTIVITY IN 2000?
A. TO FAMILY MEMBERS 12
B. TO FRIENDS 12
C. TO PERSONS IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD 12
D. TO COLLEAGUES FROM YOUR ACTUAL/
FORMER JOB
12
E. TO YOUR ACTUAL/ FORMER EMPLOYEES 12
F. TO YOUR ACTUAL/ FORMER BOSSES 12





E. TO OTHERS 12
A. CASH
B. CREDIT CARD OR BANK TRANSFER
C. EXCHANGE FOR OTHER SERVICES




IS PAID BY: TOTAL 100
A. I CAN NOT FIND AN OFFICIAL JOB 12
B. FAMILY BUDGET SUPPORT 12
C. I WANT TO CONSUME MORE 12
D. I WANT TO DO SOMETHING ALL THE TIME. 12
E. I WANT TO BE MY UNIQUE BOSS. 12
F. TAX EVASION 12
G. I ENJOY RISK 12
H. NOT TO LOOSE SOCIAL BENEFITS. 12
C08 INDICATE THE REASONS





I. OTHER REASONS: 1248
C09 WHAT % OF YOUR TOTAL INCOME COMES FROM (IN 2000):
A. RENOVATIONS AND REPAIRS OF BUILDING (CARPENTRY, PLUMBING, ELECTRICITY,
PAINTING￿
B. HOUSEHOLD MAINTENANCE (CLEANING, SNOW REMOVAL, EXCAVATION WORKS,
LAWN MOWING￿)
C. RENOVATIONS AND REPAIRS OF GOOD (CAR REPAIR, BODY WORK, BICYCLE AND
ELECTRIC APPLIANCE REPAIRS￿)
D. ROOM RENTAL
E. BABY-SITTING, CARE SERVICES (NURSING, CARE FOR THE ELDERLY)
F. PERSONAL SERVICES (HAIRDRESSING TYPING, DRESSMAKING￿.)
G. PRIVATE CLASSES (DANCING, ENGLISH CONVERSATION￿)
H. SELLING GOODS (DOOR-TO-DOOR, TELEMARKETING￿)
I. TRANSPORTATION SERVICES (CHAUFFEUR, DELIVERYMAN, MOVER￿)
J. SERVICES RELATED TO WEDDINGS AND RECEPTIONISTS (MUSICIAN, D.J.,
PHOTOGRAPHER, SINGER, CATERER￿)
K. FOOD AND CATERING SERVICES
L. PURCHASE OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCOS
M. SALE OF FARMING, HUNTING, FISHING, AND FOREST PRODUCTS
N. FACTORY WORK (ENGRAVING, WOOD SAWING, WELDING￿)





NEITHER SATISFIED, NOR NOT SATISFIED 3
NOT SATISFIED 4
C10 ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH
YOUR UNDECLARED
ACTIVITY
STRONGLY NOT SATISFIED 5
SUPERIOR TO MY EXPECTATION 1
EQUAL AS MY EXPECTATION 2
C11 YOUR CURRENT EVALUATION OF
UNDECLARED JOB (INCOME,
WORKING CONDITIONS￿)
IS: INFERIOR TO MY EXPECTATION 3
LESS THAN 10.000 KČ 1
10.001 ￿ 15.000 KČ 2
15.001 ￿ 20.000 KČ 3
20.001 ￿ 25.000 KČ 4
25.001 ￿ 30.000 KČ 5
30.001 ￿ 35.000 KČ 6
35.001 ￿ 40.000 KČ 7
MORE THAN 40.001 KČ 8







MALE 1 RSEX SEX OF RESPONDENT:
FEMALE 2
LESS THAN 999 HABITANTS 1
1000 - 4999 HABITANTS 2
5000-19999 HABITANTS 3
20000-99999 HABITANTS 4
SIZE SIZE OF TOWN













REG REGION OF SLOVAKIA
EASTERN SLOVAKIA 4